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PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES: THE EXPANDED
DUTY TO DISCLOSE FAVORABLE EVIDENCE
I. The Evans Case
On June 5, 1974, the Supreme Court of California held in Evans v.
Superior Court of Contra Costa County' that the government is constitutionally
obliged to supply the criminal defendant with a pretrial lineup. The court limited
its holding to cases in which eyewitness identification is a "material issue" and
"there exists a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification which the lineup
would tend to resolve." 2
In Evans, the defendant and a companion allegedly entered the drive-in
restaurant of James Liddle, confronted him with a .45 caliber pistol, and forced
him to hand over the cash register money, his wallet, and the wallet of a customer.
Police officers, responding to a radio call, observed two men who fit the de-
scription of the robbers running from the vicinity of the restaurant. After a
pursuit and a search which revealed two wallets, a substantial amount of money,
and a .45 caliber pistol, the police placed the suspects in the back seat of the
patrol car and returned to the restaurant. Outside the restaurant, Liddle
identified the suspects through the back window of the police vehicle. Although
the suspects never left the car and Liddle viewed only the backs of their heads
and shoulders, he claimed that they appeared to have the same physical builds as
the men who had robbed him.' The defendant later moved for a pretrial lineup
to test the accuracy of the eyewitness identification but the trial court denied
this request. The Supreme Court of California reversed and granted defendant's
motion.4
The Evans court based its decision on Brady v. Maryland's5 due process
prohibition of prosecutorial suppression of evidence.6 Brady held that "the sup-
pression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punish-
ment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."' Initially,
it may be difficult to perceive the connection between the prohibition of prose-
cutorial suppression of evidence favorable to the defense and the requirement
of providing the defendant with a pretrial identification procedure. The court
was concerned, however, about evidence which would tend to demonstrate the
accuracy of the eyewitness identification. It feared that the "inherently sugges-
tive" atmosphere of the in-court identification could not produce such evidence.
The suggestion created by the defendant's position at the defense table would
1 - Cal. -, 522 P.2d 681, 114 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1974).
2 Id. at-, 522 P.2d at 686, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
3 Id. at-, 522 P.2d at 683, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
4 Id. at-, 522 P.2d at 686, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
5 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
6 - Cal. at -, 522 P.2d at 686, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
7 373 U.S. at 87.
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virtually dictate to the eyewitness whom he was to identify.8 Because of these
facts, the court contended that if the defendant were denied the pretrial lineup
as an opportunity for discovery, "the net effect would be the same as if existing
evidence were intentionally suppressed," 9 thereby denying the defendant a fair
trial under Brady.
Without the protection of a pretrial identification procedure, a defendant
would be forced to bear the damaging effect of an in-court identification rife with
suggestion while he is unable to obtain evidence indicating the weakness of that
eyewitness identification. The question remains whether the prosecutor's duty to
disclose favorable evidence is the proper vehicle for resolution of this problem."
The California court obliges the prosecutor to establish procedures at the pre-
trial stage which will enable the defense to develop evidence which at that time
is nonexistent. Furthermore, the evidence, once developed, may not be favor-
able to the accused.
The prosecutor's duty to disclose has never been so broadly construed. The
Brady statement of the principle does not indicate that the duty is applicable at
the pretrial stage. Brady also appears to contemplate only disclosure of existing,
favorable evidence and does not oblige the prosecutor to search for evidence.
However, these objections to Evans? broad application of the duty to disclose
may be overcome. Using the policy of fairness which underlies the duty to dis-
close as a touchstone, it is apparent that the duty to disclose may validly be
construed to include the duty to provide identification procedures to the de-
fendant.
II. The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Favorable Evidence: The Policy of Fairness
The Supreme Court first planted the seeds of the prosecutor's constitutional
duty to disclose favorable evidence in Mooney v. Holahan1 and Pyle v. Kansas.1 2
In each of these cases, the prosecution knowingly procured perjured testimony in
the presentation of its case. In the dicta of Mooney, which later became the hold-
ing of Pyle, the Court observed that the prosecution violates the due process rights
of a defendant when it deprives the "defendant of liberty through a deliberate
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be
perjured.""3 Although the Court was concerned about the effect of such pros-
ecutorial acts on the defendant's case, the primary concern of Mooney and Pyle
8 As to the effect of suggestive circumstances on eyewitness identification see generally,
E. M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); N. SOBEL, EYEwiTNzss IDENTIFICA-
TION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS (1972); P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN
CRIMINAL CASES (1965); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Cap
from Wade to Kirby, 121 PA. L. Rxv. 1079 (1973).
9 - Cal. at -, 522 P.2d at 686, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
10 The typical due process issue concerning identification procedures is the fairness of the
procedure itself. See generally, Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1 (1970); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). This line of Supreme Court cases
is not applicable in the Evans context, however. Evans required an identification procedure on
the basis of due process. It did not address the fairness of the procedure itself.
11 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
12 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
13 294 U.S. at 112; see 317 U.S. at 216.
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was the reprehensible nature of the prosecutor's conduct. The Court refused to
become a party to "deliberate deception" and sought to reprimand the prosecu-
tion for its misdeeds.'14
The initial shift of the Court's emphasis from the nature of the prosecutor's
act is found in Napue v. Illinois.' The defendant claimed that the prosecutor
violated his due process right by failing to correct the testimony of his accomplice
which the prosecutor knew to be false.'6 Napue is significant for several reasons.
The Court found a due process violation despite the fact that the prosecutor had
not actually procured false testimony. 7 Furthermore, the falsity of the testimony
did not directly relate to the guilt of the defendant but merely to the credibility
of the witness.'" Finally, the Court implied in its reference to People v. Savvides"'
that the proper inquiry in determining whether the prosecutor's failure to disclose
violates due process is the resulting impact of the nondisclosure on the proceed-
ing and not the nature of the prosecutor's act: "That the district attorney's
silence was not the result of guile or a desire to prejudice matters little, for its
impact is the same, preventing, as it did, a trial that could in any real sense be
termed fair."2
The Napue decision, then, created a dramatic shift from Mooney's and
Pyle's focus on the reprehensible character of the prosecutor's conduct. Napue
uncontestably signals that the critical inquiry in a nondisclosure objection is the
fairness of the proceeding. Brady v. Maryland specifically sanctions this shift in
emphasis by holding that the "good faith" or "bad faith" of the prosecution
is not determinative of the due process question. The Court elaborated, stating
that the underlying principle of its holding "is not punishment of society for the
misdeeds of a prosecutor, but the avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused."'"
Finally, Giglio v. United States" offers uncompromising support to Napues
contention that the critical inquiry in nondisclosure cases is the fairness of the
trial. Giglio held that the failure of the government to apprise the defense of
the fact that an adverse witness who was also the defendant's accomplice was
offered immunity from prosecution violated the government's duty to disclose
favorable evidence. The Court found this due process violation despite strong
evidence which indicated that an officer of the government other than the at-
torney prosecuting the case made the offer of immunity and despite the fact that
the officer did not communicate this fact to the prosecuting attorney. The Court
focused on the resulting fairness of the proceeding and rejected the contention
that such negligence did not violate the government's duty to disclose.' 3
14 317 U.S. at 216; 294 U.S. at 112; cf., White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945) where
the Court stated that a conviction secured by the use of perjured testimony known to be such
by the prosecutor is a denial of due process.
15 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
16 Id. at 267. The false testimony was the witness' contention that he was not offered
assistance by the government in exchange for his testimony.
17 Id. at 269; cf. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 74 (1967).
18 Id. at 270.
19 1 N.Y. 2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956).
20 Id. at 557, 136 N.E.2d at 854-55, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
21 373 U.S. at 87; cf. Note, Government Has Duty to Implement Effective Guide-
lines to Preserve Discoverable Evidence, 1971 DuKE L.J. 644, 645.
22 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
23 Id. at 152, 153.
[February 1975]
[Vol. 50:508]
The shift from Mooney and Pyle is, then, complete. It is not the nature of the
prosecutor's conduct which is dispositive of the due process question but rather the
resulting fairness of the trial. Indeed, as indicated by Giglio, even a seemingly
"innocent" act on the part of the government may violate due process if a rami-
fication of that act is an unfair proceeding. This underlying policy of fairness
greatly assists the sketching of the contours of the prosecutor's duty to disclose
favorable evidence. It is the touchstone through which the obstacles to Evans'
broad application of the duty to disclose may be overcome. It provides the basis
for interpreting the duty to disclose as including the government's duty to supply
the defense with identification procedures.
III. Objections to Interpreting the Duty to Disclose as Including the Duty to
Provide Pretrial Identification Procedures
A. The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose and the Pretrial Stages
Evans treated the defendant's request for a pretrial lineup as a request for
discovery. The court granted this motion on the basis of the constitutional duty
of the prosecutor to disclose favorable evidence.2 4 Brady, however, in its enuncia-
tion of the disclosure principle did not specify the stage of the proceedings at
which the government must disclose exculpatory evidence. Several courts con-
sequently have held that the duty to disclose does not apply to the pretrial
stage.2 5 Although Brady is not explicit on the matter, the spirit of Brady dictates
that the timing of the disclosure be determined by the defense's ability to capital-
ize on such evidence." The underlying policy of the prosecutor's duty to disclose
is fairness to the defendant. In order to implement this policy, the duty must be
operative at whatever time necessary to assure usefulness to the defendant. In the
case of evidence indicating the weakness of eyewitness identification, this stage
is pretrial.
B. The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Only Favorable Evidence
A pretrial identification procedure may incriminate the defendant as well
as exculpate him, depending upon the outcome of that procedure. The objection
then may arise that the principle of prosecutorial disclosure applies only to favor-
able evidence and therefore does not govern the case in which the nature of the
evidence is undetermined. In United States V. Bryant," however, Judge Skelley
Wright exposed the shallowness of this reasoning. The defendant Bryant was
24 - Cal. at -, 522 P.2d at 684, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
25 United States v. Moore, 439 F.2d 1107, 1108 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Fla. 1971); United States v. Gardner, 308 F. Supp. 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Zive, 299 F. Supp. 1273, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United
States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993 (D.NJ. 1968).
26 Note, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 CHI. L. Rav. 112,
117 (1973); Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 19 OxzA. L. R.v.
425, 429 (1966); Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the
Defendant, 74 YALB L.J. 136, 145 (1964); United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 163(S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. Gleason. 265 F. Supp. 880, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
27 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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convicted for the sale of narcotics. In the course of the investigation, a police
agent made tape recordings of the narcotics transaction between himself and
Bryant but the recordings were misplaced and therefore could not be produced
upon request of the defense counsel. Since the contents of the tapes were crucial
to the question of guilt or innocence and since they may have been "significantly
'favorable'" to the defendant, the D.C. Circuit held that these recordings were
within the scope of the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose.28 Judge
Wright held that the due process requirement of Brady demands the disclosure
of evidence if the suppression "might" harm the defendant. A contrary determi-
nation would unjustifiably disadvantage the defendant by precluding the con-
stitutional necessity of disclosure simply because the government has lost or mis-
placed such evidence and therefore is unable to determine if that evidence is
"favorable" to the accused."
The similarities between Bryant and Evans indicate that the Bryant conten-
tion that "favorable' means "might be favorable" should be binding in the
Evans context. In each case, the type of evidence sought bears heavily on the
proof of the defendant's innocence or guilt. A properly conducted pretrial identi-
fication procedure provides the "unavoidable possibility" that the evidence there-
from will be "significantly favorable" to the defendant."0 In Evans as in Bryant, if
the prosecutor's duty to disclose does not apply because the nature of the evidence
is undetermined, then a pedestrian act by the government would preclude the
defendant from procuring the evidence. The fact that the evidence sought in
Evans "might be favorable," then, is sufficient to justify the application of the
prosecutor's duty to disclose "favorable" evidence.
C. The Duty to Disclose and the Search for Evidence
Without exception, the cases which have required the prosecutor to disclose
favorable evidence have concerned factual situations in which the evidence sought
actually existed either at or prior to the time of the request and the government
had actual possession of the evidence at one point in time. It was the deliberate
or negligent nondisclosure of this evidence which gave rise to the violation of the
prosecutor's constitutional duty. No case before Evans has held that the duty to
disclose obliges the prosecution to develop evidence for the accused. On the
contrary, the courts and commentators have unanimously held that Brady does
not require that the prosecution search for evidence on behalf of the defense.8'
The one case that might be cited in favor of the proposition that the government
is required to search for evidence is People v. Hocker.2 The defendant was con-
victed of murder while claiming that the deceased had committed suicide. The
defense contended that there was a suppression of evidence concerning the suicide
28 Id. at 648.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See, e.g., Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966); State v. Reyna,
92 Idaho 665, 448 P.2d 762 (1968); Ginsburg, Disclosure to the Defense in Criminal Cases, 57
ILL. BAR J. 194, 206-07 (1968); Note, Disclosure of Favorable and Material Evidence Required
Although Procurable by Diligent Defense Counsel, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 764, 768 (1967).
32 423 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1970).
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claim because the police had failed to conduct fingerprint, ballistic, and paraffin
tests. The court, while noting that a better investigation by the police would have
aided the jury, maintained that the investigation was not so poor as to amount to
a suppression of evidence and a consequent denial of due process.3 One may
conceivably draw the inference that an investigation could be of such low quality
as to amount to a suppression of evidence. Recognition of the ultimate holding
of Hocker, together with the authority to the contrary, however, renders this im-
plication of the case tenuous precedent for the Evans proposition that a duty to
disclose includes a duty to provide a pretrial identification procedure. 4
1. Evans and the Prosecutor's Duty to Search for Evidence
The prosecution is generally not obliged to search for evidence. In Evans
the defense did not request the government to seek additional evidence but only
sought a procedure, which is peculiarly within the government's control,"
through which the defense might develop its own evidence. Gregory v. United
States" provides authority for this distinction. There, the defendant's counsel
was unable to interview eyewitnesses to a murder because the prosecutor had
instructed them not to speak with anyone unless he was present. The court noted
that there was no direct suppression of evidence as contemplated by Brady. "But
there was unquestionably a suppression of the means by which the defense could
obtain evidence."3 The D.C. Circuit recognized that without such interviews
the defense could not know the content or the strength of the eyewitness testi-
mony. The prosecutor's advice had frustrated this effort and denied the de-
fendant a fair trial. 8" Although the prosecutor in Evans did not advise against
a lineup, the fact that the trial court refused to provide such a procedure
combined with the fact that the procedure was peculiarly within the control of
the government rendered the government's action even more prohibitive than
the advice of the prosecutor to his witness in Gregory. Moreover, the applica-
tion of the disclosure principle in Evans is more appropriate than its application
in Gregory. The court in Gregory found a violation of the duty to disclose even
though allowing the interview of the eyewitnesses without the prosecutor present
could encourage tampering with evidence and suborning of perjury. 9 No such
competing interests need be overcome in Evans. The lineup would have taken
place in the laboratory-like conditions of the police station in full view and
under the control of police officials and the prosecutors."
33 Id. at 964.
34 There are no cases which cite Hocker to this effect.
35 - Cal. at -, 522 P.2d at 687, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 127. Here, the Evans court notes
that the defendant has neither the facilities nor the experience to conduct a lineup. Id.
36 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969).
37 Id. at 188-89.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 An analogous line of cases has held that due process requires the government to
afford the defendant charged with public intoxication an opportunity to have the alcohol level
of his blood tested. See, e.g., State v. Snipes, 478 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Mo. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 979 (1972); State v. Hill, 277 N.C. 547, 178 S.E.2d 462 (1971); State v. Tietz, 107
N.J. Super. 176, 257 A.2d 726 (1966); State v. Munsey, 152 Me. 198, 127 A.2d 79 (1956).
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2. The Duty to Disclose and the Performance of Affirmative Acts
Although Gregory indicated that there is a distinction between searching for
evidence and providing procedures through which favorable evidence might be
obtained, it did not determine the scope of the prosecutor's duty to provide such
procedures. The Gregory court prohibited prosecutorial acts that effectively
destroy the means by which the defense can obtain evidence. Evans, on the other
hand, required the government to perform affirmative acts in supplying the de-
fense with such means. To what extent does the prosecutor's duty to disclose
require affirmative acts such as providing an identification procedure?
The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Bryant directly addressed the issue of
whether nonpreservation of evidence by the government amounts to an un-
constitutional suppression, as does a bad faith destruction or withholding of
evidence by the prosecution." The government contended that since the re-
quested evidence was lost and therefore not in its possession, it could not produce
such evidence and consequently its duty to disclose was not violated. The court
regarded this argument as much too facile and indicated that the maintenance
of a meaningful safeguard may require additional affirmative acts on the part of
the prosecutor to insure disclosure. Judge Wright reasoned that because the effect
on the fairness of the proceeding is the same when the evidence is lost and there-
fore unavailable as it would have been had the prosecutor withheld existing
evidence, the duty to disclose necessarily contemplates an additional duty of
preservation. Any alternative rule would encourage the prosecution to be careless
in its maintenance of evidence at the expense of the accused.' Bryant indicates,
then, that the policy of fairness underlying the duty to disclose demands that the
prosecutor not only disclose favorable evidence but also take affirmative steps to
preserve such evidence.
United States v. Heath' and Trimble v. State 4 embellish Bryant's holding
that a duty to disclose may include affirmative acts by the prosecutor to preserve
evidence. In Heath, the defendant, who was charged with willfully evading
payment of income tax, claimed that the government's loss of his income tax
record was an effective suppression that denied him due process. The court,
focusing on the policy of fairness underlying the government's duty to disclose,
maintained that the government must take affirmative steps to preserve favorable
evidence. While conceding that the government did not willfully withhold
evidence, the court held, however, that this fact was of no comfort to the accused
in the preparation of his case and because of the resulting prejudice due process
was violated. 5 In Trimble, the police had seized a letter from the defendant's
house and subsequently misplaced it. The contents of the letter may have sub-
stantiated a claim of self-defense against a murder charge. The court admitted
that this was not strictly a suppression case as that term is generally employed.
The court reasoned, however, that the effect of the officer's action was as damag-
41 439 F.2d at 644.
42 Id. at 650.
43 147 F. Supp. 877 (D. Hawaii 1957).
44 75 N.M. 183, 402 P.2d 162 (1965).
45 147 F. Supp. at 878, 879.
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ing to the defendant as if the evidence were known to the prosecution and not to
the defendant.4 6 The court consequently found a violation of due process based
on a violation of the government's duty to actively preserve evidence.
Finally, in Giglio v. United States'7 the Supreme Court sanctioned affirma-
tive action by the government to enable it to comply with its duty to disclose
favorable evidence. The Court stated that to the extent that its finding of a due
process violation based on negligent suppression of evidence placed a heavy
burden on large prosecutors' offices, these offices could promulgate procedures
and regulations to assure the communication of all relevant information. s The
Court implied, then, that the fairness policy of Brady was sufficiently strong to
compel the government's adoption of techniques to preserve the defendant's due
process rights. The question of whether the government must, in addition to mere
disclosure, take affirmative action to preserve evidence is, then, answered. When
steps are necessary to effectively implement the policy of fairness underlying the
duty to disclose, they must be taken. The fact that the defendant in Evans
requested the government to take affirmative action in supplying him with an
identification procedure cannot therefore be considered an insurmountable ob-
jection to his request based on the government's duty to disclose favorable
evidence.
3. Affirmative Action and Evidence Not Presently Existing
The Gregory court indicated that a suppression of the "means" to obtain
evidence not yet in existence may be a violation of the prosecutor's duty to dis-
close. Bryant, Heath, Trimble, and Giglio maintain that the duty to disclose
evidence may implicitly require that the prosecution take affirmative steps to
preserve such evidence. The Evans application of the duty to disclose principle
is a synthesis of these two contentions. As noted by the California Supreme
Court, there is no case which has employed such an extreme application of the
prosecutor's duty to disclose. 9 The cases and commentators indicate that the
disparity between the prosecution's and the defense's investigative tools is a
major cause of the unfairness that results from the government's failure to dis-
close favorable evidence.50 Because the defense "does not have the manpower or
resources available to the state in its investigation of the crime,"'" it is at an
initial disadvantage in its effort to garner favorable evidence. The constitutional
duty of the government to disclose favorable evidence is fashioned to mitigate
this inherent unfairness in the criminal proceedings. If the disclosure principle
is aimed at alleviating the unfairness created by the comparative dearth of
defense investigative tools, the requirement of providing identification procedures
46 402 P.2d at 164, 165; cf. Lee v. United States 368 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
47 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
48 Id. at 154.
49 - Cal. at -, 522 P.2d at 684, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
50 Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J., dissenting);
Ellis v. United States, 345 F.2d 961, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Application of Kapatos, 208 F.
Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evi-
dence, 19 OxzkI. L. REv. 425, 428 (1966); Note, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 143 (1964).
51 Application of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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to the defendant falls naturally within that principle. The cases support the
obligation of the government to affirmatively act in order to preserve evidence
and they prohibit actions on the part of the government which effectively destroy
"means" by which the defense may obtain evidence. The policy underlying the
disclosure principle provides the necessary link which permits the synthesis of
these two lines of cases. The government may be obliged to affirmatively act so as
to provide the defendant with the "means" to obtain favorable evidence.
D. The Burden of Providing Identification Procedures
The final objection to interpreting the prosecutor's duty to disclose as in-
cluding the duty to provide the defense with an identification procedure is that
such a requirement would overburden the prosecutor. A consideration of the
negligent suppression cases exposes the fallacy of the objection. The overwhelm-
ing majority of cases hold that due process is violated just as certainly if the
government negligently suppresses evidence as if it intentionally suppresses it.52
The factual basis of these decisions indicates that the burden placed on
the prosecutor is much greater than that which would be imposed by requiring
the government to provide the defense with an identification procedure. United
States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp.53 held that the failure of the govern-
ment to properly maintain a witness' file and thus render that file inaccessible at
the time of the trial was an effective suppression of evidence. The court deter-
mined that the government was responsible for maintaining the evidence in such
a way that would be available at trial even though the negligent act was com-
mitted by a mere employee of the antitrust division. The fact that someone from
the division had not properly cared for the evidence was sufficient to cause a
suppression of evidence. 4
In Ingram v. Peyton,5 5 the prosecutor had misstated the name of the gov-
ernment's chief witness in the indictment. Consequently the defense was unable
to locate any previous convictions of the witness for impeachment purposes.
The court rejected the argument that because the misstatement was not inten-
tional no violation of due process occurred. "The question is whether the de-
fendant was deprived of an effective defense because the critical information
was unavailable .... 5'
The courts have further extended the negligent suppression principle to
cases in which the exercise of due diligence by the defense counsel would prob-
52 United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Keogh, 391
F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Ahmad, 53 F.R.D. 186 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Hanson
v. Cupp, 484 P.2d 847 (Ore. 1971); Means v. State, 429 S.W.2d 490 (Ct. Grim. App. of
Tex. 1968); Hale v. State, 230 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. 1967). But see, United States v. Sanders,
322 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Pa. 1971); State v. Kahinu, 53 Hawaii 36,, 498 P.2d 635 (1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973); Geelan v. State, 182 N.W.2d 311 (S.D. 1970) (holding
that an intentional suppression is necessary to create a violation of due process).
53 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961).
54 Id. at 570.
55 367 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1966).
56 Id. at 936.
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ably have uncovered the "suppressed evidence."5 In Levin v. Katzenbach
the defendant was charged with grand larceny. A key part of the government
witness' testimony indicated that the defendant refused to receive the $35,000
entrusted to him in one thousand dollar denominations. The witness purportedly
returned to the bank where he received the 35 $1,000 bills and exchanged them
for a like amount in $20 denominations.5" The prosecutor, however, neglected
to disclose to the defense that the bank official failed to recall such an exchange.
The court held that such a failure was a suppression of evidence and a violation
of due process.80 It did so despite the fact that the defense counsel had inter-
viewed the bank official and failed to inquire about the incident, that the defense
counsel never requested such information of the prosecutor, and that every
rational inference indicated to the prosecutor that the defense had such infor-
mation at his disposal."' The court reasoned that defendant's claim of relief
based on the prosecutor's duty to disclose challenges the fairness and therefore
the validity of the proceeding. Relief therefore cannot depend on whether more
diligent counsel would have discovered the evidence on his own. 2
These cases indicate that the burden placed on the prosecutor in order to
avoid negligent suppression far exceeds that which would be imposed upon him
by requiring identification procedures."5 The government's duty may be breached
by a clerical error of lower echelon personnel," a spelling mistake in the indict-
ment,"5 or a failure by the prosecutor to disclose information to the defense in
circumstances that indicate that the defense had the information or at least access
to it.68 The true significance of these cases, however, is not found in the argu-
ment that they place a larger burden on the prosecutor than would be required
for identification procedures. They are significant because they indicate that the
critical inquiry in a due process disclosure question is not the resulting burden
on the prosecution any more than it is the nature of the prosecutor's act. It is
the fairness and therefore the validity of the proceedings and not the resulting
burden on the prosecutor which determines the scope of the prosecutor's duty
to disclose.
IV. Conclusion
The prosecutor's duty to disclose provides a valid constitutional basis for re-
quiring the government to supply the defendant with a pretrial identification
57 This is a significant step considering that the disclosure principle has been analyzed
as a response to the disparity between the defendant's and the prosecution's investigative tools.
See note 49 supra.
58 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
59 Id. at 289.
60 Id. at 292.
61 Id. at 295 (Burger, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 291; cf. Barbee v. Warden Maryland Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 845-46 (4th
Cir. 1964); Note, Prosecutor's Failure to Disclose Evidence Equally Available to the Defense
May Constitute a Violation of Due Process, 42 NoTR DAME LA w R 264 (1966).
63 See Evans v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, - Cal. -, 522 P.2d 681,
687, 114 Cal. Rptr. 121, 127 '(1974), where the court notes that the burden of providing an
identification procedure is a nominal one.
64 United States v. Consolidated Laundries, 291 F.2d 563, 570 (2d Cir. 1961).
65 Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1966).
66 Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J., dissenting).
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procedure upon the defendant's request. Although an initial consideration of
the duty may suggest that such a requirement is beyond the scope of the duty, a
closer analysis indicates the contrary. The development of the underlying policy
of fairness provides a touchstone for determining the parameters of the disclosure
duty. The objections to interpreting the duty to disclose as including the duty
to provide identification procedures are refuted by a consideration of the court's
interpretation of the duty in other contexts.
Using fairness as a touchstone, the contentions that the disclosure principle
does not apply to the pretrial stage, that it applies only to existing favorable
evidence, and that its application in Evans would overburden the prosecutor
become untenable. The result of this theoretical analysis is also consistent with
practical considerations which surround identification in the criminal trial. If
the criminal proceeding is viewed as an effort to determine factual guilt, the
strength of identification evidence should be properly tested. The defense should
be afforded the opportunity to display the inability of the eyewitness to select the
defendant in a formally conducted identification procedure.87 It is merely this
opportunity that the Evans court seeks to supply. The court's implementation
of the disclosure principle in this effort, although novel, is both valid and de-
fensible.
Patrick T. Duerr
67 - Cal. at -, 522 P.2d at 685, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
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